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1. Introduction  
 
The notion of cognitive bias has attracted the attention of argumentation scholars in different 
ways over the years. From a theoretical perspective, a number of them (see e.g., Correia, 2011, 
2014; Bardone, 2011; Jackson, 1996; Walton, 2010; Oswald & Hart, 2013) have discussed the 
role of cognitive biases in relation to the production and reception of argumentative fallacies, 
building on the assumption that argumentative fallacies can be taken to exploit errors and non-
optimal outputs of biased cognitive processes. From an applied and pedagogical perspective, 
scholars interested in critical thinking teaching have reflected on the means instructors might 
have at their disposal in order to counter the effect of biases (see e.g., Zenker 2013; Larrick 
2008). MacPherson’s paper is directly relevant to this second strand of research, as it proposes a 
discussion of debiasing techniques. 
 In the context of medical diagnosis and more specifically regarding misdiagnosis errors 
that have been shown to originate in cognitive biases, MacPherson discusses the debiasing 
solution advocated by Croskerry (2003), namely cognitive forcing, reviews empirical counter-
evidence to Croskerry’s claims, explains why cognitive forcing might not work and argues that a 
better solution is to be found in adapting the shared mind approach to medical diagnosis. In this 
commentary I take the opportunity to further explore the theoretical ramifications of the notion 
of cognitive bias (section 2.1), the merits of the MacPherson’s assessment of debiasing 
techniques (section 2.2) and the virtues of argumentation as a systematic tool to be implemented 
in the shared mind approach to debiasing (section 3). 
 
2. Some critical comments 
 
2.1 What counts as a cognitive bias? 
 
The first point of discussion I want to raise has to do with the notion of bias MacPherson uses, 
and so this is rather a discussion of the work MacPherson draws on rather than a discussion of 
his work proper.1  
 Building on a body of literature on the role of cognitive biases in medical contexts, 
MacPherson identifies different types of biases that might negatively influence the outcome of a 
medical diagnosis: according to him (and to the literature he draws on), race, age, ethnicity and 
gender are typically the sort of personal features that physicians unconsciously take into account 
                                                 
1 Even if the observations made here in principle percolate to MacPherson’s account. 
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as they provide a diagnosis, and this can, in some cases, result in a biased diagnosis, with the 
associated potential of being extremely detrimental (if not lethal) to the patient. From his review, 
MacPherson rightly concludes that “cognitive biases are a very real problem in medical 
diagnoses and that this problem therefore needs to be addressed if every patient regardless of 
race, ethnicity, age or gender is to have access to the best medical opinions free of irrational 
biases” [my italics]. Recalling a real example (see Croskerry et al., 2013), MacPherson reports 
that a physician who, based on the fact that a young female patient suffering from respiratory 
problems is referred to by a psychiatrist, does not think of pneumonia and attributes the symptom 
to anxiety, is responsible for making a biased decision: the physician is making a decision which 
a priori rules out (or does not even take into account) this condition based on the patient’s recent 
history, age and gender—and this should not be the case (in the example given, the patient died 
following misdiagnosis). 
It is interesting to note in passing that McPherson takes biases to be “irrational”. This, I 
believe, warrants some further discussion. Looking at the example above, one cannot help but 
wonder whether the same cognitive process, in case the patient’s respiratory symptoms were 
indeed attributable to anxiety issues, could lead to a desirable outcome such as improving the 
patient’s condition. In other words, it is perfectly reasonable to assume that the same cognitive 
process could lead to an optimal result—which would in fact be compatible with the idea that 
biases and heuristics are not always a bad thing (see Gigerenzer et al., 1999). The question we 
need to ask, therefore, is whether this is (ir)relevant to identifying the process as a bias or not: 
since what changes from Croskerry et al.’s example to my hypothetical case is the context and 
not the cognitive process itself, saying that in one case we witness biased decision-making and 
not in the other falls short of making an informative claim on the process—since in both cases 
the process is the same. Moreover, in this hypothetical example, there are grounds to consider 
that the decision is perfectly rational: given the situation and the means at the physician’s 
disposal (factoring in time and efficiency constraints in the ER, for instance), the decision is 
indeed rational because it represents a desirable course of action in view of attaining the desired 
goal under the circumstances. The question is, again: is it a bias in this case? If it so happens that 
the patient is a member of the group targeted by the bias, then the diagnosis might just as well 
turn out to be correct. This would compel us to take a stance on whether we are prepared to 
identify successful diagnosis as the result of bias.2 
In order to start answering the question, let us first focus on the operational definition 
MacPherson (2016) uses, and which he borrows from Haselton et al. (2005), namely that “a 
cognitive bias involves a departure from accepted standards of rationality morphing into an 
idiosyncratic standard.” As seen above, the purported (ir)rationality of biases is directly relevant 
to critically examining the definition. Yet, there is more at stake here. One of the major features 
of this definition is that it does not discriminate between types of biases. The biases examined by 
MacPherson include gender, race, ethnicity, age: their influence in medical diagnoses is assessed 
in terms of the outputs these biases generate, which are problematic. I would argue that no clear-
cut reason is offered in the paper to consider that these are instances of biases—rather, 
MacPherson assumes that they are—and not of something simpler, namely prejudices or mere 
opinions. 
If we take a simple mechanistic perspective on how information is processed, we may 
consider that a medical diagnosis involves an inferential process which takes into account some 
                                                 
2 I would probably go as far as claiming that the diagnosis is informed by heuristic processing. Whether this can be 
assimilated to a bias is a separate question. 
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input information (a patient’s observable or measurable psycho-physical condition), processes it 
against background information (medical encyclopaedic knowledge, knowledge of probabilities 
based on history, etc.) and yields an output (the medical diagnosis) which then informs the 
decision to treat the patient in a particular way. Once we adopt this perspective, it becomes 
apparent that the biases MacPherson discusses have to do partly with the information that is 
immediately accessible (is the patient a female or a male, a young or old person, etc.?) but 
mostly with the content of background information, which consists for instance of information 
about specific groups being probabilistically more associated with certain conditions than others. 
In other words, these biases, per se, are due to the presence of a piece of background information 
(e.g., “young female patients are less likely to suffer from a heart condition than others”, 
“respiratory problems are more likely to be caused by anxiety in psychiatric patients than by 
pneumonia”) that is available to be used in the diagnostic inference. Deep down, this boils down 
to being prejudiced (and I am not using the term for its evaluative import) against certain groups, 
in the sense that the representations associated to that group, in the medical domain, are different 
from the representations associated to other groups. It thus seems that the sort of bias discussed 
by MacPherson is of a conceptual nature: these biases are triggered by a particular content 
playing a role in the inference. Moreover, looking at the inferential process, it appears that the 
only difference between gender, age, race or ethnicity biases is in the end the content of the piece 
of information that is being used in the diagnosis inference—the nature of the inference does not 
have to be different in all cases; what differs is the nature of the information you feed it. 
To further illustrate this point, let us compare a gender bias with another overwhelmingly 
studied bias in cognitive psychological literature, namely the confirmation bias (see e.g., Oswald 
& Grosjean, 2004), which is usually defined as the mind’s propensity to represent, select, store 
and look for information that confirms (or does not contradict) information that is already present 
in the cognitive system. From this description, it appears that the confirmation bias is a 
procedural bias, that is, it consistently applies regardless of the specific contents of the cognitive 
system and of the information it is being fed. Put differently, the nature of the confirmation bias 
is a constraint on the way information is processed, selected, and not a given piece of 
information, i.e., not a representation—which, to me, seems to be what the biases discussed by 
MacPherson amount to. Because its operation is independent from content, the confirmation bias 
is therefore procedural, while a so-called gender bias would be conceptual, since its presence is 
synonymous with the presence of a representation about some feature typically associated to a 
given gender. 
From this brief discussion, two options emerge: either we restrict the notion of bias to the 
notion of procedural bias or we extend it to cover content as well. The first option would entail 
considering gender, race, age and ethnicity biases as mere prejudices that may or may not be 
present in a cognitive system—they are contents but not functions. The second option would 
include representations in the category of biases, alongside procedures, putting the former on a 
par with procedural biases. The first option would suggest, therefore, that there are no gender, 
age, race or ethnicity biases, but rather that representations which are gender-, age-, race- or 
ethnicity-relevant may play a role in a diagnosis inference and that they may contribute to 
yielding a problematic biased output. In this case, I would still argue that there is a bias, but I 
would attribute this to the overarching influence of the confirmation bias. Upon seeing a young 
female patient with respiratory problems sent in by a psychiatrist, a physician would look for a 
diagnostic that confirms the information that is available before their eyes, and this would 
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explain, provided the age prejudice is present in the physician’s cognitive environment, why the 
diagnosis might exclude pneumonia and privilege anxiety issues.3 
One reason to prefer this analysis has to do with its minimalistic advantages: once we 
adopt a procedural definition of bias, we prevent the list of biases from being ever-expanding. If, 
on the contrary, we allow for conceptual biases, there is virtually no limit as to what can 
constitute a bias, as illustrated by the following reduction ad absurdum: as stated by Haselton et 
al. (2005), biases become idiosyncratic, and there is no a priori argument to exclude unlikely—
but possible—biases against green eyed people or biases against people whose breaths last 
thirteen point five seconds. In such a scenario, the theoretical model would simply collapse by 
allowing for a virtually infinite set of ad hoc biases. 
What this discussion shows is that if we want to account for the influence of biases in 
inferences, a theoretical model needs to reflect on the very nature of bias. I have argued that a 
procedural construal is to be privileged. However, this is not directly a problem for 
MacPherson’s account, since (i) his discussion can be adapted to fit this distinction by 
postulating the overarching operation of the confirmation bias – or any other suitable alternative 
– and a knowledge base which contains prejudiced representations, and (ii) the main point of his 
contribution is to discuss debiasing techniques in the context of medical examination. I now turn 
to discussing his assessment of existing debiasing techniques. 
 
2.2 On debiasing 
 
In his discussion of ways to avoid bias in medical diagnosis, MacPherson reports on Corskerry’s 
(2003) techniques of ‘cognitive forcing’, which involve critical self-reflection. His main 
refutation of Corskerry’s proposal rests on the premise that many biases are unconscious, which 
makes people who suffer from them unable to critically self-reflect on these biases. In so doing, 
MacPherson puts forward the idea that cognitive forcing techniques are only applicable to 
conscious biases—and as such that they problematically leave the debiasing of unconscious 
biases out of the picture. 
Instead, MacPherson advocates a shared mind approach to prevent biased decisions from 
being made. Under this approach, medical decisions are envisioned as a collaborative process 
involving a number of medical practitioners and patients. Shared deliberation is claimed to be 
advantageous in that (i) it allows for truly informed consent, (ii) it produces better outcomes than 
individual processes, and (iii) it shares cognitive load between participants. These three features 
are taken to increase the likelihood of nonbiased decisions. To be more explicit, deliberation 
promotes critical testing, provides a platform for argumentation, fosters multiple perspectives 
and, crucially, provides the opportunity to identify the bias of one participant. Regarding this last 
point, MacPherson’s idea is that in such a case, the biased diagnosis will end up being eliminated 
or reduced, which in turn will filter out its effects in the result of the decision making process. 
This type of approach makes intuitive sense and bears some resemblance with the 
encouragement of cognitive diversity which some philosophers advocate in order to weaken the 
impact of conspiratorial beliefs within a community (see Sunstein & Vermeule, 2009); the idea 
would be to make sure that potentially biased claims are publically confronted, with the presence 
of refuting evidence, so that community members are exposed to alternative viewpoints. 
While this strategy seems effective to make sure that the end decision is unbiased, I 
believe we should be cautious in affirming that it represents a proper debiasing technique. What 
                                                 
3 The same line of reasoning would hold for what MacPherson refers to as age, race and ethnicity biases. 
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MacPherson refers to as an unbiased outcome is, actually, just that. i.e., an unbiased outcome, 
and we should refrain from assuming that it is indicative of genuine debiasing. By this I mean 
that the contribution of the medical practitioner who holds a biased representation (about gender, 
race, age, ethnicity) is certainly neutralised in the decision-making process, but that this is quite 
different from the situation in which the individual is properly debiased (which would 
correspond to the situation in which that same individual no longer holds the biased 
representation to be true). 
Filtering out should consequently not be taken to be the same thing as debiasing, even if 
the outcomes of both might fully overlap. The difference between them is that the first is focused 
on making sure that the result of the inference is bias-free, which amounts to reducing the 
influence of bias through a collaborative process. Yet, this is not equivalent to making sure that 
the bias disappears: it is about preventing it from playing a role in the decision making process. 
Conversely, the second process, debiasing, targets the individual’s cognitive processing in order 
to, ideally, get rid of the bias altogether. If debiasing is successful, then the inference itself would 
be bias-free from that point on. Taken as a “technique used by external agents to modify the 
decision environment” (Larrick, 2008, p. 317), a shared mind approach to medical diagnosis 
would be effective only under one crucial condition: the bias needs to be identified at some point 
of the discussion. In this respect, it must be acknowledged that this approach may fail to work for 
a number of reasons, among which include the following two. 
First, imagine the (again) hypothetical but possible case in which all participants to the 
deliberative process are prejudiced in the same way. Imagine, for instance, that all of the agents 
share the assumption that young females are unlikely to suffer from heart disease, and moreover 
that none of them thinks of challenging that representation during the exchange. In such a 
scenario, and independently of the nature of the discussion, it is possible that the output 
diagnosis will be biased. This thought experiment suggests that even deliberation might fail to 
yield an unbiased outcome. 
Second, imagine that the physician who holds a biased representation about young 
females not being likely to suffer from heart disease is an extremely skilled arguer, and that their 
co-participants are not. The deliberation might still turn in their favour, even in light of criticism, 
thus still allowing a biased diagnosis to emerge. 
I would venture that the shared mind approach to debiasing does have merits on its own, 
but that it should be carefully accompanied by some auxiliary measures in order to lead to 
genuine debiasing. In other words, I believe that in addition to attempting to neutralise the effects 
of the bias, the shared mind approach should be supported by clear argumentative measures in 
order to achieve genuine debiasing. 
  
3. Genuine debiasing: How (else) to reach it? 
 
I believe that MacPherson’s proposal may achieve genuine debiasing provided it is supported by 
careful argumentative measures (see also the discussion on countering the polarization effect in 
Zenker, 2013; Oswald, 2013).4 I furthermore believe that this can be justified in light of both the 
cognitive and social ins and outs of argumentation, to which I now turn. 
                                                 
4 I refer the reader to Oswald (2013) in particular for a more extensive account on the relationship between 
reasoning and debiasing. The shared mind techniques advocated by MacPherson are, in my view, likely to be 
successful for roughly the same reasons I identified in that paper. 
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In their argumentative theory of reasoning, Mercier & Sperber (2009; 2011) have shown 
that reasoning performs at its best in its ‘natural habitat’, namely in argumentative discussions. 
According to the theory, people provide and evaluate arguments in optimally efficient ways 
when they are motivated to do so, i.e., when their claims are explicitly challenged in 
conversation or when they feel the need to challenge the claims of others because they disagree 
with them. In other terms, people are good reasoners when they enter challenging argumentative 
exchanges. One of the main reasons for this is that an argumentative context provides both the 
motivation and the affordances required to induce self-reflection and multiple perspective taking. 
On their own, i.e., outside a conversational context, people are likely to trust their own cognitive 
processes, even if these are biased (see Sperber et al. 1995); however, in argumentative 
discussions they are likely to face contradicting claims. Accordingly, in such contexts they are 
likelier to need to find arguments supporting their claims and arguments contradicting their 
opponents’ claims. This is actually the first necessary step towards debiasing: forcing one to find 
arguments for one’s claim is exposing it and amounts to exposing its potential flaws. Due to the 
social pressure of the discussion, one will then have to find better arguments. If one is unable to 
come up with such arguments, chances are that one will recognise the weakness of one’s 
position.5 The advantage of argumentation over individual self-reflection is its ability to trigger a 
first-hand experience of being wrong but also the fact that it allows us to understand the causes 
of our errors. Summing up, encouraging people to reason might be the right way to go to achieve 
debiasing goals. 
Thus, the shared mind approach defended by MacPherson has prospects of being 
effective as a genuine debiasing technique not on the grounds that it might filter out biased 
representations in the deliberative process,6 but on the condition that the participants to the 
deliberation take their argumentative roles seriously. A shared mind approach might therefore be 
effective because (i) it provides a platform for disagreement, which is a necessary condition to 
identify and make multiple opinions public, (ii) it provides a platform for the production and 
evaluation of arguments, and, as such, (iii) it provides a social platform which is likely to 
activate the cognitive mechanisms involved in reasoning. 
The constraints that I have previously evoked in the success of the shared mind approach 
are thus of an argumentative nature. In what follows I list some of them in order to paint a 
schematic picture of the sort of procedure that might be envisaged. In order to foster genuine 
debiasing, the requirement of the shared mind approach to medical diagnosis would first include 
making errors public as the result of critical testing, this taking the shape of an explicitly 
argumentative procedure. In other words, identifying the error should be the result of an 
argumentative discussion in which the party that is responsible for the error has been cornered 
into not being able to justify their claims. Only then can the debiasing process hope to really 
start. Such a framework should ideally specify the usual obligations and prerogatives linked to a 
critically reasonable argumentative practice. Participants should be aware that putting claims 
forward is committing, that they need to observe the obligations linked to the burden of proof, 
that they are required to provide arguments for their claims and that these arguments are to be 
evaluated according to some agreed-upon standard. In case they fail to justify a given diagnosis 
on its merits (and rejection of a diagnosis should also be inter-subjectively agreed upon), not 
                                                 
5 We could argue that this is all the more likely in medical diagnosis deliberations, given the high stakes associated 
to their outcome (in a life and death situation, personal feelings such as pride might be put aside in favour of 
diagnosis accuracy). 
6 As seen above, this runs the risk of getting rid of the output of the bias but not of the bias itself. 
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only should they withdraw their claim, but they should also commit to reflecting on why they 
were defending the claim in the first place, which should allow them to identify the prejudiced 
representation—and this is something that will be made accessible by the argumentative 
discussion. Perhaps an additional constraint would be to explicitly instruct participants to be 
charitable with other participants’ opinions, so as to make sure that evaluative procedures target 
the merits of the arguments being exchanged instead of being based on one’s own position. 
The main idea behind such a ‘systematised shared mind approach’ would be to make sure 
that deliberation in medical diagnoses systematically takes the form of an argumentative 
exchange, since it is likely that the way to debiasing goes through the triggering of reasoning 
processes, the latter being in full effect in argumentative contexts. 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
In this commentary I have first taken the opportunity granted by MacPherson’s focus on 
cognitive biases in medical diagnoses to discuss the very notion of bias, arguing in favour of the 
narrower construal of procedural bias. In relation to this distinction, I have furthermore critically 
discussed the main argument given by MacPherson against Croskerry’s debiasing technique of 
cognitive forcing, which then led me to assess his proposal of a shared mind approach to 
debiasing. I critically assessed his proposal, arguing that (i) it might prevent the result of bias 
from being influential, but not the bias itself, thereby failing to secure genuine debiasing and (ii) 
it might fail in some cases. 
In an attempt to further develop the model presented, I suggested that a systematic 
enforcement of argumentative standards might enhance the model by making sure that the 
techniques advocated by MacPherson take place in a truly argumentative context. Therefore, I 
suggested that the input of argumentation theory could be extremely profitable to the 
implementation of debiasing techniques based on the shared mind approach. All in all, the idea is 
to make sure that participants to the deliberative process in medical diagnoses use their reasoning 
abilities; the way to do that, I believe, is to get them to argue. 
A final set of caveats needs to be recognised. This discussion makes sense from a 
theoretical perspective, but we should not forget that the ideal speech situations depicted herein 
rarely occur in real life: in the ER, physicians oftentimes need to make decisions very quickly; 
medical staff might not always be available when needed; humans may fail, for whatever reason, 
to be charitable and to consider other people’s opinions seriously, etc. Those are but three 
complications that would prevent the possibility of conducting diagnosis deliberations as 
outlined here, and this highlights that discussions should remain attuned to the specificities of the 
contexts under examination. 
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